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ESCALATION OF CO!VJMlTMENT: AN INTEGRAT IVE MODEL OF IN DIVIDUAL, 
ORGANIZATIONAL, AND CONTEXTUAL PR EDI CTORS 
William J. Donoher, Missouri State Uni versity 
This article seeks to extend th e existing literature on escalarion of commitm ent by presenting an integrative m odel of the 
escalation process. Individual, organi~a tio nal, and contextual predictors jointly influence the decision to com mit 
additional resources to an existing course of action or to witlulrmv and pursue alternative opportunities. Specifically. 
realization of past losses and the extent to 1vhich th e individual is identified with th e origina l decision moderate the 
relationship between th e individual 's risk preferences and risk propensity. In turn , th e escalation decision j(JIIOII 'S from 
risk propensity, but various organizational and contextual predictors eith er increase or decrease th e strength of th e 
relationship. Th e model 's implica tions for th eO IJ' and practice are discussed. 
From Main Street to Wa ll Street, and from living roo ms 
to board rooms, the question o f whether to di sengage from , 
or commit additi onal money, time, energy or other resources 
to, a previous course of ac ti on is pervasive. Regardless o f 
the co ntex t in which the issue ari ses, however, answering th e 
disengagement ques tion requires the dec ision maker to 
engage in a subj ecti ve, probabilit y-based eva luati on of th e 
future prospects o f various a ltematives, including 
continuation o f the ex isting commitment. The dil emma is 
obvious: a lthough many such dec isions ult ima tely are 
successfu l, many others si mply result in magnifi cati on of the 
losses already sustained. From a dec ision-making 
perspecti ve, the question is how to avo id the Iauer in 
circumstances in which dec ision makers are predisposed to 
that option. 
The purpose of th is arti c le is to consider the occurrence 
of esca lati on in an orga ni za ti onal contex t, in which a vari ety 
of factors at the indi vidual , orga ni za ti ona l, and contex tual 
levels are operati ve and may joint ly infl uence the final 
dec ision. A substanti al body of previous resea rch has 
documented the influence o f individual characteri stics and 
cogniti ve processes that affec t dec ision making in escalation 
settings (e.g., Staw. 1976). Resea rchers also ha ve examined 
organi za ti onal, as distinct from individual, escalat ion (Ross 
& Staw, 1993) and the contex tual and orga ni za tional 
ant ecedents of decision-making under risk (e.g., Sitk in & 
Pab lo, 1992; Sitkin & Weinga rt , 1995) . The interacti on of 
organi zati onal-level influences with personal characteri sti cs 
has received less attention (Jo hns, 2006), but its occurrence 
has been documented (S himi zu. 2007) . Th is article thus 
altempts to unite these dispa rate app roaches in an integrati ve 
model that focuses upon the spec ific c ircumstances attending 
the escalation process. 
The fram ework presented in thi s arti c le is centered on 
the notion that indi viduals bring to the dec1sion-maki ng ta sk 
certa in idiosyncrati c approaches to risk and dec is ion making 
that may be more or less sens iti ve to orga ni zational 
pressures and elements o f the decision co ntex t (Sitkin & 
Pab lo, 1992). As used in thi s arti cle, the phrase 
"orga nizational pressures" refers to the organi za ti on's ri sk 
preferences and the strength o f its cultural re tl ec ti on of that 
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preference. "Decision contex t" refe rs to the hi stori cal bJsis 
of the dec is ion and the indi vidua l's in vo lvement in and 
responsibilit y for that dec is ion. The a1·gument advanced 
here is that considerati on and in tegrati on o f these fa ctors is 
critical to undcrstJnding the esca latio n phenomenon and its 
likelihood, because more th an an individual's attitudes and 
preferences are incorpora ted in any decision: orga ni za tions, 
notJbl y one such as Enron with its fam ously ri sk-seeking 
culture (13 yrne, 2002), ha \'e predJspOS lllOns and exert 
stronge r or wea ker pressures on ind i\' idua l dec ision make rs, 
whi ch wi ll res ult in different outco mes in different dec ision 
co ntex ts. Depending upon the prcc1se Interacti on of these 
va ri ous factors, then, escJ !ation may be more or less li kely 
to occur. 
The at1i cle is presented in fo ur sec ti ons. The first 
beg ins with a definiti onal overview of key tenmnology and 
constructs uti lized in the arti cle, as \\'e ll as th e boundary 
conditions and assum ptions under lvi ng the model. The 
second secti on presents the theo reti ca l fo undation of 
escalati on and dec is1on making unde r ri sk, and is fo ll oll'ed 
in the third secti on by the elabo rat ion of th e proposed model. 
The art ic le concludes ll' ith a discuss ion of the model's 
implications for both theo ry and practi ce. 
r RMINOLOGY, ASSUi\IPT IONS , AN D 
CONDITIONS 
The model elabora ted here in re li cs up on a disti nction 
between ri sk pre ference and ri sk propensity, and therefore 
follows the convention ofS itkm and Pablo ( 1992). As used 
in this artic le, " risk preference" refe rs to the mdi vidual's 
cogniti ve orientati on to\l'a rd risk (Broc kJ1aus. 1980). "Risk 
propensit y", on the other hand , refers to the ind1 vidua l's 
"current tendency to takf" or avo id ri sks" (S 1tkin & Weinga rt , 
1995: 1575; emphasis added). In th e1r in sightful arti c le, 
Sitkin and Pablo ( 1992) desc ri be some of th e potential 
ant ecedent s of ri sk propens ity, of whi ch ri sk preference is 
but one. The clea r im plicati on of th ei r II'O rk is tha t ri sk 
propensit y and risk preference arc not necessanl y 
coex tensi\·e, but rather may be quit e diffe rellt dependi ng 
upon the nature o f other intluences operati\'C in a parti cul ar 
dec ision contex t. 
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Another imp! ica tion of this di stinction between the two 
constructs li es in the degree to which risk preference and 
ri ,; k propensity are seen as stab le tra its or s ituati onal 
characteri stics o f the dec ision maker. Man y researchers 
have viewed ri sk propensit y as a stable di spos itional 
attr ibu te (Fischhoff et a l. , 198 1; Wolman, 1989) . Other 
research, however, appea rs to indicate that risk propensit y 
may va ry over time (March & Shapira, 1987 ; Osborn & 
Jac kson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart , 1995) . Reso lution of the 
debate may be found in the ri sk preference-risk propensity 
d ichotomy, in which the former is seen as more stab le, and 
therefore di spos itional, than the latt er principall y because 
ri sk propensity is a current tendency (S itkin & Weingart , 
1995) that ma y be influenced by a vari ety o f situati onal 
fa ctors (Si tki n & Pablo, 1992) other than ri sk preference. 
T hus, the dec ision maker ' s ri sk preference, a stab le 
characteristi c, will affec t th e dec is ion to esca late 
commi tment , but will do so only ind irec tl y through the 
moderating e ffects o f ri sk propensity, it self dependent upon 
the nature and interac ti on of va rious fa ctors exogenous to the 
indt vid ual. 
Among these exogenous fac tors are the va ri ous 
cogniti ve processes identifi ed in the escalati on literature, and 
d iscussed in more deta il below, that bias dec ision making in 
fa vo r of esca lat ion. Although labeled d ifferentl y depending 
upon the source o f the bi as , these influences tend to result in 
some identifi cati on o f the individual with the original 
dec is ion, e it her because others recogni ze th e dec is ion 
make r's responsibi li ty for the dec ision (e.g. , Staw, 1976) or 
because th e dec is ion maker se lf-ide nti fi es with the course o f 
acti on or feel s co mpell ed to cont in ue due to va rious 
hi sto ri cal or co ntex tual influences (e.g., Brockner & Rubin , 
1985). The process by which the ind ividual identifi es with , 
or becomes identifi ed with , the ori ginal course o f acti on is 
referred to in thi s art icle as ' 'individuati on." T he tern1 is 
used to app ly to the presence or absence of any or all of the 
c lements prev iously identifi ed in the literature as antecedents 
o f th e escalati on dec is ion. 
Two key assumptions and boundary eo o1 ditions of the 
proposed model a lso should be noted at thi s juncture. First, 
the model assumes that cho ice , however circumsc ribed, 
ex ists. In o ther words, the indi vidual dec ision maker must 
be ab le to choose to withdraw from or to comm it additional 
reso urces to the ori gina l course o f ::1 cti on. Simi larl y, the 
model is not app li cable to condi tions in whi ch regulatory or 
contractua l obli ga tions compel a given course o f action, or 
where orga ni za ti onal commitments have become so large 
that disso lution is threatened by withdrawa l (Ross & Sta w, 
1993 ). 
Second , thi s art icle assumes th at ri sk seeking i3 more 
likely th ::1 n ri sk avers ion to lead to escala ti on (Wh yte, 1986). 
Th is obse rva ti on in vites di scuss ion o f the nature o f ri sk and 
unce rt::~in t y. The concept o f ri sk has been defin ed in vari ous 
te rms, ranging from a poss ibilit y o f loss (Ya tes & Stone, 
199::! ) to a venturi ng into the unknown or the commitment of 
a relattvcly large proporti on of ex isting assets (Baird & 
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Thomas, 1985). Implicit in these definiti ons is the notion of 
a degree of uncert aint y, particul arly that assoc iated with a 
probabili sti c eva luati on of future alternati ve outcomes. 
Give n uncert ainty, and the attendant possibilit y of loss, 
different indi viduals (and orga nizations) may react 
differentl y to the same s ituati on. Generall y speaking, 
enac ted behavio r under such circumstances may va ry from 
ri sk aversion to risk seeking (Chil es & McMackin , 1996). 
Where an indi vidual (or orga ni za tion) fall s on thi s 
continuum may be a functi on of framing effects, as predicted 
by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ; Whyte, 
1986, 1989) , or organi za ti onal culture (Chiles & McMackin, 
1996; Morgan, 1986), whi ch helps defin e the general 
organi za tional ri sk profil e. 
With these definiti onal c larifica tions and boundary 
conditi ons in mind , the nex t two secti ons of the arti cles are 
devo ted to the deve lopment o f the esca lati on process model. 
First, the theoretica l bases o f escalation are sketched, 
fo llowed thereafter by the fom1 al presentati on of the mode l. 
THEOR ETI CAL BACKGROUND 
The foundati ons of the escalat ion literature can be 
traced to the work of Becker ( 1960) . In developi ng a 
gcner::1 l conceptuali za tio n of commi tment , Becker argued 
that commitment is d( endent upon a lin kage o f the dec ision 
maker's interes ts to a line of ac ti vit y by means of a side bet, 
whi ch he characteri zed as o f some identi Gable asset or 
sa li ent rewa rd obtainable onl y through consistent behav ior 
or dec isions. Depending upon the relati ve importance or 
va lue of the side bet to the dec ision maker, the cost of 
inconsistency and the po tenti al loss of the s ide bet may be so 
great that any choice o ther than consistency becomes 
infeas ible. T herefore, Becker suggested, consistency is 
more likely to ari se in connec tion with acti vit ies or dec isions 
bolstered by signifi cant side bets. 
Impli cit ly ut ili zing Becker's notion o f commitment by 
means of indi vidu::1! identifi cati on, subsequent resea rchers 
and theo rists have deve loped ::1 broader ex planation of the 
escalati on phenomenon through the deve lopment of two 
different, although conceptuall y related and interconnected, 
perspecti ves. One approach, relying heavi ly upon constructs 
deri ved fro m cognit ive di ssonance theory (Fcstinger, 1957) , 
focuses primaril y on the ex tent to which the decision maker's 
need for self-j ustifi cati on relates to esca lation, while the 
second stream, dealing with entrapment and sunk cost 
eff'ccts, exa mines th e influence of the historica l co ntex t on 
present dec ision making, apart from the normati ve or 
ev::1 luati ve processes implic it in the justifica ti on research. 
In the seminal empirica l wo rk in the justifi cati on 
stream, Staw ( 1976) in ves ti gated the relationship between 
indi vidual responsibi lit y for a previous course o f action and 
the dec ision to increase the leve l of commitment to that 
course of acti on. Trea ting proj ec t success or fa ilure and 
level o f responsib ilit y as independent variables, Staw 
detennined that those who were hi ghl y responsible for the 
initi ::1 l all ocati on dec ision were more likely to increase 
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funding than those who mere ly assumed respo ns ibilit y fro m 
a preceding dec is ion maker. These dec is ion makers' needs 
for self-j ustifi ca ti o n unde r such c ircums tances thus pred ic ted 
escalation. Other researchers have reached s imil ar 
conc lus ions in studies co nside ring variati o ns o f S taw's 
fram ewo rk (Brockner, e t a l. , 1986 ; Lea the rwood & Co nlo n, 
1987; Lydon & Zanna, 1990; S imonson & Staw, 1992). 
More recently, Haywa rd and Shimi zu (2006) demo nstrated 
that de-co mmitment was mo re like ly to occur w he n the 
decision maker could attribute the cause o f unde r-
performance to factors o ther than hi s o r her indi v idual 
involvement. 
By contrast, the entrapment lit erarure adop ts the 
assumption tha t the hi sto rica l contex t o f the dec is ion may 
influence present dec is ion making and behavio r, but that the 
process does no t necessaril y enta il no rma ti ve cons idera ti ons 
and the decision maker's need o r des ire to justi fy the 
decisio n (Brockne r & Rubin , 1985 , pp . 6-7) . Resea rch in 
thi s area thus has in ves ti ga ted the timing o f events o r 
expected o utcomes and the sa lience o f such events or 
outcomes to the indi v idua l dec is io n maker (B rockner, e t a l. , 
1982 ; Brockner, Rubin , & Lang, 198 1; Fox & S ta w, 1979 ; 
Rubin & Brockner, 1975) , exogeno us influ ences such as ro le 
models (B rockner, e t a l. , 1984) , and sunk cost effec ts, whi ch 
incorporates a more exp li c itl y eco nomi c co ntex t (Ga rl and , 
1990). T he key finding o f thi s body o f wo rk is the gene rall y 
posi ti ve relati onship be tween so me in ves tment o f the 
dec ision maker, e .g. o f tim e o r resources, and the tendency 
to ma inta in o r inc rease co mmitment. 
In general , the fo rego in g studi es, w hether employing the 
pe rspective of justifi cati o n o r entrap ment , a re no tab le fo r the 
consistency wi th whi ch they document the re lati onship 
be twee n ps yc ho log ica l processes, de ri ved from so me 
attachment o r inves tment , and the pro pensit y to ma inta in or 
esca late co mmitm ent. As indica ted above, thi s arti c le treats 
the process o f attachment o r id entifi ca ti on as a unita ry 
construct referred to as " indi v idua ti o n." The presence or 
absence of any o f these vari o us influ ences, w he the r deri ved 
fro m justifica tio n o r entrapment , is thus see n as o ne po tenti a l 
pred ictor of esca la ti o n. 
Despite strong evidence of the main e ffec ts o f 
indi viduation (B rockner, 1992) , resea rch in thi s a rea is no t 
without its critics, so me o f w ho m argue that the literature 
mi sco nstrues dec is io n co mpl ex ity as dec isio n erro r (Bowen, 
1987 ; Northcraft & W o lf, 1984). Ind eed , at leas t one stud y 
employing a multi theo re tica l ana lys is di sc losed ev idence 
contradicting the jus tifica ti o n stream (S taw & Ross, 1978). 
The implica tion of these findin gs is tha t so me thing o the r 
than indi viduation may acco unt for o r influence the 
esca lation phenomeno n. 
An altemative theore ti ca l lens fo r the esca la tio n 
phenomenon suggested b y so me of these critics (e.g .. 
Whyte, 1986) is prospect theory (Ka hneman & T versky, 
1979) , which explic itl y co ns ide rs decis io n frame and ri sk 
o rientati on in predic ting subsequent behavio r. According to 
the theory, rea li za ti o n of e ither losses or gai ns fro m past 
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decis io ns res ult s in bi ased eva lu a ti o n o f ri sk and probab le 
o utco mes. In parti cubr, ex pe ri enced losses prese nt the 
dec is io n make r w ith a cho ice between a certa in o utco me (th e 
ex peri enced loss) and an unce11ai n o utco me (add iti o na l 
in ves tment) th at may result in a la rger loss o r so me pos it ive, 
o r less nega ti ve, e nd result. In such c ircum stances, prospec t 
theo ry predi cts the la tter course o f ac tio n w ill be se lec ted , 
even w hen the ex pec ted va lue is less than th ~t o f the cnt~ in 
o utco me, as is typi ca ll y the case. Thus, ri sk-seekin g 
behavior is ex pected in the doma in o f losses . whe reas 
ex actl y the o ppos ite result (ri sk averse behavio r) is ex pec ted 
in the doma in o f gai ns. O n an o rga ni za ti o na l leve l, th is 
e ffec t was de mo ns trated by Mil le r and C he n (2004), who 
showed tha t o rga ni za ti o na l ri sk inc reased as prox imit y to 
bankruptcy increased . A ltho ugh no t w itho u t its own criti cs 
(e.g. , Brockner, 1992 ; S itkin & Pabl o, 1992; Sit k in & 
We inga rt, 1995) , prospect theory neverthe less o ffe rs an 
ad diti ona l pe rspecti ve o n esca la tio n, and thu s mu st be 
cons ide red as an addi tiona l po tentia l predi c tor of suc h 
behavio r. 
A ll o f the forego ing wo rk ado pted the indi vi d ua l as the 
foca l unit o f ana lys is. The rea ft er, resea rchers began 
co ns idering hi gher level influences o n dec is io n processes 
genera ll y, and esca la ti o n in particu la r. T wo studi es foc us in g 
on o rga ni za ti o na l esca la ti on a re th ose by Ross and S taw 
( 1986, 1993), whi ch exa mi ne the British Co lu mb ia wor ld' s 
la ir and the deve lopment of th e Sho reham nuc lea r power 
fac ilit y, respective ly. Imp li c itl y re ly in g up on the ea rl ier 
wo rk of S taw ( 198 1) and Slaw and Ross ( 1988) , Ross and 
Sta w's ( 1993) ana lys is o f the c ircumstances sun-ound ing the 
Sho reham pl ant revea led a fo ur s tage tempo ra l mode l o f 
co mm itment th at embe lli shed the ir init ia l esca la ti o n 
pro to type ( 1986: 293 -295 ). The S ho reham s tudy sugges ted 
that, w ithin each s tage, co mb ina ti o ns o f fi ve dete rminants 
(proJect, psycho log ica l, soc ia l, o rga ni za ti onal and 
cont ex tua l) are opera tive, the influ ence of each o f w hi ch 
va ries w ith the s tage in questio n. Important ly, the earli e r 
orga ni za ti ona l pressures buil d in the esca la ti on process, the 
mo re li ke ly esca la ti o n beco mes . 
T he imJ 'rtance o f this mode l, w ith its ex pli c it 
recogniti o n of fa c to rs o the r th an p ure ly cogniti ve o r 
psyc ho log ica l processes, ca nn o t be unders tated. Un like th e 
researc h co nd ucted previous ly in the area of esca la ti o n, w ith 
its e mphas is o n indi vidua l reac ti o ns and eva luat ive 
processes , the Sho reham work and its predecesso r exp la in 
o rga ni za ti o nal co mmitment as a soc ia l pheno meno n . The 
tempo ra l mode l thus provides a ri cher, more comp lete 
pic ture of th e dec is io n process w ithin an o rga ni za ti o nal 
co ntex t. However, the mode l does no t exp lic it ly add ress the 
influe nce of o rgani za tio na l fa c to rs o n indi vidual dec is io n 
process; ra th er, esca la ti on is seen as an o rga ni za ti o nal 
respo nse to a va ri e ty of influ ences, one o f w hich is 
ind iv id ua l cogni ti o n. 
In an ins ightful wo rk th a t add resses the ques ti o n o f 
ex tem~ l inlluences o n indi v idua l behav io r, S itki n a nd Pab lo 
( 1992) prese nted a genera l decis io n process mode l th a t 
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at tempts to lin k individua l cogn iti ve processes w ith 
o rga ni zati o na l and cont ex tua l fa c tors. Key to the ir mode l 
a re th e med ia ting ro les o f ri sk pro pens it y and ri sk percepti o n 
in de te rmining individual ri sk behavio r. Vari ous 
antecedents occurring a t different levels of ana lys is a re 
pro posed to affec t behavio r o nl y thro ug h the intervening 
influence o f ri sk p ropens it y and ri sk perceptio n. A ltho ugh 
th e mediating ro le o f ri sk percep ti o n has no t been 
unequi voca ll y supported in subsequent research (S itkin & 
We inga rt , 1995), the mode l is promis ing for its multil evel 
approach to dec is ion mak ing, espec ia ll y the no ti o n that ri sk 
pro pens ity is no t so le ly dependent upon in dividua l ri sk 
pre fe rence. 
These rather d ispara te research s treams present an 
oppo rtun it y to reco nceptua li ze the esca lati on process by 
integrat in g the ir findin gs and predict io ns in a multil eve l 
mode l. T he ultim ate goa l of such a mode l is to p rovide 
ri cher de tai l and ins ight int o esca lation and , according ly, to 
add ress gaps in ex isting theory tha t c ritics of eJch 
perspecti ve have identifi ed (Bowe n, 1987 ; Broc kn er, 1992; 
itkin & WeingJrt, 1995; W hyte, 1986) in order to improve 
o ur understanding o f th is impo rtant pheno menon. The 
fo ll owin g sec tion prese nt s the esca lati o n p rocess mode l in an 
e ffo rt to beg in this ta sk. 
THE ESCALATION PROCESS 1\ JODEL 
Risk Preferences a nd Risk Propensit y 
Co ns iderati o n of the esca lat io n process mode l beg ins 
w ith th e o bserva tio n tha t indi v iduals do no t co me to the 
esca la tion con tex t as b lank s la tes, but rather ex hibit ce rta in 
pre fe rences wit h respect to ri sk and unce rta int y. In gene ra l 
te rms , these pre fe rences are charac teri zed as risk see kin g o r 
ri sk avers ion (C hil es & M cMac kin , 1996). As d isc ussed in 
the o pening sec ti on, ri sk pre fe rences a re assum ed to be 
rclntive ly s tab le di spos iti o na l charac ter is ti cs of the 
indi v idua l, and thus g uide tha t indi vidua l 's subsequent 
behavio ral cho ices . Despi te re lati ve ly s tab le unde rl y ing risk 
pre fe rence, indi vidu a ls do no t a lways ac t in a unifo rml y ri sk 
averse o r ri sk seeking manner, but rat her m::~y ex hi bi t e ither 
tendency depend ing upon the ex igenc ies o f the s itua tion 
(F iege nbaum & T ho mas , 1986) . T his o bserva tion fo ll ows 
from th e pos ited di stinc tio n be twee n ri sk pre ferences and 
ri sk propens it y (S itkin & Pablo, 1992) , pursuant to whi ch 
risk p re ferences are but one influ ence o n risk pro pens ity , 
whi ch in tum is a predic tor of behavio r. 
W hen co ns ideri ng the typ ica l esca lation sce nar io, th e 
co ntext ua l variables w ith w hi c h we are co ncerned a re the 
ex tent o f indi vid uati o n present and the rea li za ti on o f losses 
assoc iated w ith the prev io us dec is io n. Pas t esca lat io n 
researc h (e.g., !3rockner, 1992; Staw, 1976) and prospec t 
theo ry (e.g ., Kahne man & Tvcrsky, ! 979) , respectively, 
predict pos iti ve main e ffec ts fo r th ese var iab les o n the 
dec is io n to esca late. T ha t is, if Indi v iduati on is present , 
esca lat io n is mo re li ke ly, as is true w he n losses o n an 
ex is tin g proj ect have been rea li zed . B ut it is a lso poss ible 
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tha t bo th aspects of the co ntex t may be present and should 
be conside red j o intl y rathe r th an in iso la tio n. M oreover, the 
joint occurrence of indi vidua tio n and loss rea lizati o n defin es 
the decis ion co ntex t wit hin w hi ch the ind ividual dec ision 
maker, w ho possesses estab li shed risk prefe rences, operates. 
T he cumul a ti ve e ffect o f a ll of these influences may be quite 
different than the main effects predi c ted fo r indi viduation 
and loss rea liza ti on when trea ted separate ly. 
In th is model, the joint occuiTence of ind ividuati on and 
loss rea li za ti on is expected to moderat e the re latio nship 
between ri sk pre fe rences and ri sk propens it y. Prospect 
theo ry predi c ts that the effect of loss rea liza tion is an 
increase in ri sk seeking beha vio r (Ka hneman & Tversky, 
1979) , bu t th is outco me s hould be greate r in the presence of 
ind ividuati o n than in its abse nce, g iven the tendency o f 
indi viduat io n to lead to esca latio n (e. g ., S taw, 1976). 
Individuation thus mode ra tes the e ffec t o f loss reali za tio n o n 
the re lati onship be tween ri sk pre fe rences and risk 
propensity. 
T he cumul a ti ve e ffect o f these re latio nships is that ri sk 
pre ferences, absent o ther fac to rs, influ ence risk propens it y in 
the direc ti o n of the indi v idua l 's und e rlying ri sk preferences 
(S itkin & Pablo, 1992) . Thus, pre fe rences fo r ri sk avers io n 
(o r seeki ng) lead to a p ro pens it y to avo id (o r seek) ri sk. 
I Iowever, bo th indi vi ' ua ti o n and loss rea liza tio n lead to 
esca lati on, whi ch suggests that the indi vidual' s ri sk 
propens ity is biased toward ri sk seeking, even if tha t 
indi vidual' s ri sk pre fe rence is o the r than ri sk seekin g. 
Because risk pre fe rences are seen as re lati ve ly stab le 
di spos iti ona l charac te ri stics (e.g ., Fi sc h.ho ff e t a l. , 198 1; 
Wo lman, 1989), indi v idua ti o n and loss rea li za tio n must 
modera te the re latio nshi p bet wee n ri sk pre ferences and risk 
propens ity fo r a ri sk averse indi vidua l to unde rtake risk 
seeking beha vio r. T he cumul ati ve e ffect o f indi vid uati o n 
and loss rea li za ti o n on ri sk propens ity va ries depending 
upo n the und erl ying ri sk pre fe rences o f the indi vidua l 
dec is io n make r. Risk seekers arc like ly to ex hib it ri sk 
seeking propens iti es as lo ng as e ithe r individuation o r loss 
rea li za ti on are present , but risk ave rse dec is io n makers w ill 
ex hibit highe r ri sk propens ities when bo th fa c tors are present 
than when o nl y loss rea li zati o n is present. 
Proposition I a: For a ri sk seeking indi vidua l, 
eithe r indi viduation o r loss rea li za ti on w ill inc rease 
risk pro pens it y and induce esca lati on. 
Propositi on l b: Fo r a ri sk averse indi v idua l, both 
ind ividuati on a nd loss rea li za ti o n w ill be required 
to inc rease risk p ro pens it y and induce esca la ti o n. 
Orga nizatio na l C ulture 
A number o f eli ffe rent approaches to the stud y of 
organi zat io na l culture appear in the li te ra ture , but despite 
divergent formulatio ns o f the spec ific forms and 
charac te ris tics o f the cons truc t, culture is recogni zed as an 
inJ1erent aspect o f g roup o r o rga ni za ti o na l ex istence (Schein , 
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Do no her 
Propos ition 2: T he grea te r the deg ree o f 
combined indi vidua l and organi zat io na l ri sk 
seeking, the greater the li ke lih ood o f esca la ti o n o f 
co mmitment. 
S im ilarl y, w hen bo th the ind iv idua l and the o rga ni za ti o n 
a re ri sk averse, esca lati o n sho uld no t occur in m ost 
ins tances. Ho wever, o ne po tenti a l excep ti o n to the fo rego ing 
gene ra li za tio n may occur w hen the o rga ni za ti o na l culture is 
wea k (Da vis- B lake & Pfeffer, 1989) and the indi vidua l is 
subjec t to the influences o f ind ividu a tio n o r loss rea liza ti on, 
as d iscussed above. In such a case, be li e fs a nd va lues may 
no t be w ide ly sha red (Sc he in , 1992) o r c lea rl y transmitted 
thro ugho ut the o rga ni za tio n such tha t indi v idu a ls arc ab le to 
di scern a co herent message o r set o f ex pec ta tio ns (Ravas i, 
2006). Esca la ti on mi ght then occur as a res u lt of the 
dec is io n maker's des ire to ac hi eve a turna ro und in o rde r to 
JUSti fy th e previo us dec is io n, no twiths tand in g pe rsona l ri sk 
avers io n tha t mi ght o therwise co ntro l the o ut co me. 
Pa rti cul a rl y in th e case o f fai ling proj ec ts, prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) p redi c ts ri sk seek ing 
behavio r. The weakness o f the o rga ni za tio n's cult ure thus 
ca n be ex pected to interac t w ith respo ns ibi lit y to p roduce an 
o utco me co nt ra ry to the inhe re nt , if unspec ifi ed o r o nl y 
wea kJ y spec ifi ed , des ires o f th e o rgani za ti o n. 
Pro pos iti o n 3: The g rea ter th e degree o f 
co mbined indi v idu a l and o rga ni zati ona l ri sk 
ave rs io n, the lo wer the like lihood o f esca l:Hio n o f 
co mmitment. 
C o r o llary 3a: The g rea ter the deg ree o f indi vidual 
and o rga nizatio na l ri s k avers io n, the g rea te r the 
like lihood th at esca lat io n w ill be avo ided if 
o rga ni za ti o na l c ulture is stro ng, but the wea ke r the 
o rga niza ti o na l culture, the g rea te r the like lihood 
th at esca la ti o n w ill occ ur if indi vidua ti o n is 
present. 
W hen indi v idua l and orga ni zati ona l ri sk p re fe rences are 
no t a li gn d w ith o ne ano the r, the ultim a te dec is io n depends 
upo n the interac tio n o f psyc ho logica l influe nces w ith 
streng th of cultu re. In the case o f indi v idu a l ri sk seeki ng 
and o rgani za ti o na l ri sk avers io n, a stro ng culture sugges ts 
grea te r beha vio ra l confo rm ity (Mc Na mara , Moon & 
Bromil ey, 2002; So rensen, 2002). In such an enviro nment , 
indi vidua l risk pro pens iti es o r pre ferences have less impac t 
as mo ti va to rs. In parti cu lCJ r, if ind ividua ti o n induces a risk 
p ro pens ity (S itki n & Weinga rt , 1995) favo ring r isk-see king 
be hav io r and escala ti o n, inte rn a l processes re fl ec ti.1g the 
o rga niza t ion's ri sk avers ion a rc like ly to co ns tra in the 
indi vidua l's cho ices in a way th a t minimi zes o r e liminates 
the like lihood o f esca la ti o n (M cNa mara , Moon & 13romil ey, 
2002). W hil e ind ividua l ri sk pre fe rences fCJvo ring ri sk-
seekin g may be mo re difficult to co ns tra in , g iven tha t they 
represent stab le tra it s ::md the re fo re are mo re like ly to exert 
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constant in flu ence than indi v idua tio n processes (Sitkin & 
Weinga rt , 1995), Ravasi (2006) no ted tha t s tro ng cultures 
transmit behav iora l s igna ls a nd c lues to the indi vid ua l that 
guide subseq ue nt behavio r. T hus , eve n w here s table 
d ispos iti o ns are a t issue , cultura l streng th w ill limit an 
indi vidua l 's sense o f dec is io na l freedom. However, this 
d iscuss io n suggests how eas il y these individual pre fe rences 
can be ac ted upon if the organi za ti o na l culture is weak and 
the indi vidua l is subj ect to indi vidua tio n o r is o therwise ri sk-
seeki ng. Wit ho ut the o rga ni za ti on 's clea r and cons istent 
cues (Ravasi, 2006) to s igna l accepted behavior, conformit y 
is less li ke ly to occur (Davis-B lake & Pfe ffer, 1989), and the 
ind ividua l is more like ly to ac t upon then-ex isting risk 
pre fe rences and propens it ies (S it k in & We inga rt , 1995) by 
pursuin g esca lati o n. Thus, 
Propos ition 4: T he grea ter th e degree o f 
o rga ni za ti o na l ri sk ave rs io n and s treng th o f culture, 
the lower the like lihood o f esca la ti o n, even g iven 
indi vidua l ri sk seeking, bu t the wea ker the 
o rga nizati o na l cu lture and the g rea ter the level o f 
psycho log ica l infl ue nces, the g rea ter the like lihood 
o f esca la ti o n. 
Fina l! ) 111 those cases in w hi ch the o rgani zatio n is ri sk 
seekin g and the indi v idua l is ri sk ave rse, we should ex pect 
the s tim ulus o f o rgani zati o na l impe rati ves in a strong culture 
to ove rco me any indi vidu a l te ndency to avo id ri sk. T hi s is 
prec ise ly th e scena ri o suggested by Lu mpkin and Dess 
( 1996) , who no ted th at "a t the leve l o f' the linn , ri sks are 
taken tha t wo uld no t be taken by a fir m member" (p . 145) . 
Thus, even fo r an ind ividu a l lac kin g in ri sk-seekin g 
tendenc ies, the beha vio ra l cues a t th e o rga ni zatio na l leve l 
(Ravas i, 2006), embedded in and re info rced by a strong 
culture induc in g con fo rmit y (Da vis- B lake & Pfe ffe r, 1989; 
Sche in , 1992), will ind uce a r isk-seeking pro pens it y and , 
ultim ate ly, esca la ti o n. T his tendency w ill be eve n s tronger 
in those cases in w hi ch an indi v idua l 's s tab le pre ferences fo r 
ri sk-avers io n arc ac ted upo n by indi v id uati o n processes. 
However, as sugges ted above, in a wea k cultu re virtua ll y no 
d irec t influ ences bea r upo n th e ind ivid ua l to co unte rmand 
his o r her in tcm al s tandards w ith regard to ri sk, and in such 
cases we s ho uld ex pec t a dec is io n to avo id esca la ti o n. 
Pro p os iti on 5: T he grea te r th e degree o f 
o rga ni za tio na l ri sk seeking and strength o f culrure, 
the g rea te r the li ke lihood o f esca la ti o n, eve n w hen 
the indi vid ua l is ri sk ave rse, but the wea ker the 
o rgani za tio na l culture and th e lower the leve l o f 
psycho log ica l influences , th e lower the li ke lihood 
o f esca la ti on w hen the indi v idu a l is ri sk averse . 
CONCL US IO N 
T hi s a rti c le has a ttempt ed to ex pand the findin gs o f 
prev ious research o n the esca la ti o n phenomeno n. The v iew 
pos ited here ex plic itl y recogni zes the influ ence o f ri sk 
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preferences and organi zati onal culture and argues that the 
decision process is a complex interplay of such indi vidual 
and organizational characteri stics. Spec ifi call y, the ex tent of 
organiza ti onal and indi vidual ri sk preference co ngru ence 
relati ve to the strength of o rga ni za ti onal culture and the 
extent to which the dec ision maker is subj ect to the 
psychologica l influences identified in the ex isting literature 
are viewed as predi ctors of escal ation. 
It is particul arl y important to note that where differences 
in organi zati onal and indi vidual risk profil es ex ist, thi s 
artic le proposes that organi za ti onal preferences will be 
fo llowed in all cases but those invo lving weak 
organi zational culture in combinati on with psychological 
influences that magnify indi vidual ri sk preferences, thereby 
producing outcomes that are contrary to the presumed 
organizationa l choice with res pect to ri sk. Organi zat ions 
thus may wi sh to pay parti cul a r attention to the 
circumstances producing such behaviors give n th e potenti al 
dys functional outcomes that may result. The clea r 
implica ti on of thi s d iscuss ion is th at orga ni zations th:Jt 
implement spec ific po lic ies are more li kely to succeed in 
co ntrolling influences that o th erwise operate to provide 
individual dec ision makers with what amount to cross-
incenti ves (e.g., McNa mara. Moon & Bromiley, 2002 ). 
Moreover, to the ex tent orga niza ti ons arc concemed with 
promoting out comes such as app ropriate leve ls of risk-
seeking or risk-averse behav iors and dec is ions, attent ion to 
cultural cues (Ravasi, 2006) outside of poli cies and 
procedures also is important as part of an overall e ffort to 
develop and sustain a strong culture. 
This raises an import ant iss ue that remains for future 
research to in ves ti ga te and deve lop, specifica ll y the 
distinction, if any, between cultural strength aris ing from 
procedural sources (M e amara, Moon & Bromilcy, 2002) 
and that arising from shared va lues inherent in the culture 
itse lf (Schein , 1992) . For purposes of determi ni ng 
organi zational influences on ind ividua l dec ision-maki ng, it 
is not necessaril y c lea r whi ch o f the fo rego ing cultu ral 
featu res is necessa ry and whi ch is suffi cient , or whether bo th 
are necessa ry to secure the des ired outcome. 
Likewise, is there a difference in effect between either 
culture or procedures and incenti ves? We are beg inning to 
appreciate how difference incenti ve sys tems affec t ri sk 
perception and behavior (e.g., Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998) . Future research in ves ti ga ting the differenti al e ffects 
o f incenti ves on esca lation wo ul d add to both litera ture 
streams. 
Finall y, there are many potenti al avenues of inquiry 
relating to person-o rga ni zati on fit (e.g., Chatman, 1989: 
Schneider, 1987) inherent in the fra mewo rk presented in thi s 
arti cle. If orga ni za ti onal and indi vidual risk preferences arc 
no t in ali gnment , will the individual or the orga ni za tion 
terminate the relati onship at some point? What :J re the 
c ircumstances under whi ch e ither mi ght do so? These are 
important questions not onl y for the esca lation phenomenon, 
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but for understanding of culture and decision-making 
interacti ons more broadl y. 
In sum , organi za ti ons exert influence and pressure on 
individua ls th rough culture and procedures. In dec ision-
making co ntexts, these pressures can fac ilit ate pos iti ve 
outcomes, or less-producti ve outco mes , such as escalation. 
Understandin g the dynami cs of these processes is important 
not only for the immedi ate decisions in vo lved, bu t a lso for 
long-term orga ni zati onal success. 
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